Wildavsky: The Politics of the Budgetary Process by De Grove, John M.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS. By Aaron Wildavsky.* Boston;
Little, Brown and Company, 1964. Pp. 216. Cloth, $4.00; paperbound, $2.50.
THE budgetary process as a political phenomenon has long been a subject
of interest for political scientists, but efforts to develop relevant propositions
and subject them to rigorous testing through the careful collection and analysis
of data have been rare. The bulk of the literature concerning the development
and implementation of budgets focuses on the administrative or economic di-
mensions of the problem; politics enters on occasion only as an unwelcome
guest that could not be turned away. In a sense, the "state" of the literature
on budgeting is simply one dimension of a passion for irrelevance that has
been characteristic of a sizable portion of "research" in political science in this
century. For, as puzzling as it may seem, the discipline which is identified by
the term "political science" spent a remarkable portion of its time prior to the
post-World War II period in excluding the careful and systematic analysis of
politics from its area of concern.
Perhaps the aversion for politics in general, and for the politics of the bud-
getary process in particular, can be explained in part by the concurrent de-
velopment of political science as a discipline and the rise of the administrative
reform movement in the United States. The working hypotheses of the reform
movement soon solidified into dogma, and political scientists spent much of
their time preaching the gospel of what ought to be, all too often with little
attention to how the organism to be reformed actually functioned. Whether an
academic discipline should spend a good portion of its time indulging in value
judgments about how the phenomena in question "ought" to operate will not
be debated here. Certainly we can agree, though, that an accurate understand-
ing of how the object of reform does in fact function is a necessary prerequisite.
Within this framework Professor Wildavsky's book is a welcome beginning
for the study of the budgetary process at the federal level. That a book that
can be described accurately as a primer of budget-making can also be described
as a major contribution to an understanding of the subject is a sad commentary
on the failure of political science to produce meaningful research in this area.
Yet The Politics of The Budgetary Process is considerably more than an
elementary effort to outline the facts of life about the politics of budget-making,
On that score alone it deserves the warm reception it undoubtedly will receive.
Yet the contribution of this piece of scholarship transcends mere description
in at least two important ways. First, it marks a clear break from the reform
movement assumption that budget matters are primarily things that have to do
with administration, and that the "good" budget process is one from which
politics is largely excluded. Second, the data that form the backbone of the
descriptive portion of the book, drawn largely from interviews and government
documents, are imaginatively and effectively organized in a way that has pro-
duced a number of concepts that will be of lasting value in the study of the
budgetary process. The book goes beyond even these contributions, however,
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in its last two sections in which the preachments of the reform movement in
the budget field are subjected to a penetrating critique.
The effort to outline the way in which budgets are made at the federal level
occupies about two-thirds of the 192 pages in the main body of the book. This
section is occupied with a detailed evaluation of how the major participants in
the budgetary process view their task and how they go about accomplishing
their objectives. Certainly the author believes that budget-making is central to
the political process: "If politics is regarded in part as conflict over whose
preferences shall prevail in the determination of national policy, then the bud-
get records the outcome of this struggle."' The concern with the politics of the
budgetary process is rather narrow, with little focus on relating the budget
to the external political system. The titles of the two major chapters con-
cerned with the description of budget-making, "Calculations" and "Strategies,"
suggest the kind of conceptualization that represents a major contribution
to the understanding of the budgetary process in this narrower sense. Cal-
culations, defined as "the series of related factors ... which the participants
take into account in determining the choice of competing alternatives,"- serve
as the conceptual framework of a vivid description, well-laced with pointed
examples, of the budgetary process in terms of major points of decision:
agency decisions on how much to ask for; Bureau of the Budget decisions
on how much to recommend; and Appropriations Committee decisions on
how much to give.
A central theme of the chapter on calculations, and one that is highly relevant
to the critique at the end of the book, concerns the incredible complexity of
the problem that faces budget-makers at the federal level. Out of this discussion
comes the concept of the "incremental approach to budgeting," a notion closely
related to the concept of incremental change developed by Robert A. Dahl and
Charles E. Lindbloom in Politics, Economics and Welfare.3 Wildavsky is here
mainly concerned with showing that the budgetary process is in fact involved
with "relatively small increments to an existing base."4 The flavor of the dis-
cussion is indicated by the following: "Budgeting turns out to be an incre-
mental process, proceeding from an historical base, guided by accepted notions
of fair shares, in which decisions are fragmented, made in sequence by special-
ized bodies, and coordinated through repeated attacks on problems and through
multiple feed mechanisms." 5 At this point, one begins to realize that Wildav-
sky, unlike many political scientists and other "budget experts," is highly
skeptical of many of the reform proposals concerning the budgetary process.
The concept of "Strategies," defined as "budgetary... actions by govern-
mental agencies intended to maintain or increase the amount of money avail-
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able to them,"6 moves the analysis more directly into the political arena. The
focus is on describing "the behavior of officials engaged in budgeting as they
seek to relate their requirements and powers to the needs and powers of
others." 7 Close attention is given to "strategies designed to capitalize on the
fragmentation of power in national politics."
Here, at the end of the descriptive portion of the book, the scope of the study
is made clear for the first time. The analysis is limited to "only those parts
of the budget within control of the participants,"9 a restriction which seems
a reasonable one considering the complexity of the subject and the absence of
research on which to build. The conclusion of the descriptive section also sets
the stage for the more controversial portion of the book, in which the major
reform proposals in the budget area are re-examined in the light of the pre-
ceding factual description of how budget-making actually works.
Unquestioning acceptance of reform-movement "principles" has been sub-
jected to severe criticism in recent political science literature. In general, the
questions raised about such doctrines as the "goodness" of nonpartisan elec-
tions, elections at large, or a management level merit system have taken the
form of an objection to assuming, a priori, that these approaches to government
are in fact better than some other set of arrangements. Thus, critics of the reform
movement have asserted that what began as hypotheses quickly hardened into
dogma without ever being subjected to any test of rigorous research or anal-
ysis. The eagerness to prescribe seemed to leave little time for systematic
description of how government really operates. Prior to Professor Wildavsky's
book, however, very little had been said about the standard reform proposals
in the budget area: the comprehensive approach to budgeting, and the "pro-
gram" as opposed to a "line item" budget. It is here that Professor Wildavsky's
study makes its most significant contribution. He criticizes the reform pro-
posals within the framework of his detailed analysis of how the federal budget
actually is made. The full implications of budgeting to the political process
become most clear at this point. As the author puts it: "Far from being a
neutral matter of 'better budgeting,' proposed reforms inevitably contain im-
portant implications for the political system; that is, for the 'who gets what' of
governmental decisions." 10
Wildavsky's critique of reform proposals, the focal point of the last two
chapters of the book, is in the mainstream of current criticism of the reform
movement in general. His objections flow from a belief that budget reform
proposals are, above all, political matters, and that most advocates of reform
not only fail to recognize this, but also insist on a naive and unrealistic defini-
tion of politics. Actually much of the disagreement between reform advocates
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reformer's definition is essentially normative; politics is viewed as an objective
search for the general interest, a scientific probe for the one right way. Such
reform doctrines as at-large elections, non-partisanship, and, in the budget
area, a comprehensive program budget in the hands of the executive flow from
the general interest definition of politics. Political conflict is viewed as bad, as
a breakdown in the system in which rational approaches are abandoned in
favor of political partisanship. The general interest view comes close to ex-
cluding politics altogether as a legitimate activity if it extends beyond a kind
of "political man," individualistic, act of voting on election day.
By contrast, Wildavsky sees politics as conflict, as a struggle among groups
pursuing contrasting and conflicting goals and objectives. The political process
becomes a search for compromise, for accommodation, for adjustment to the
realities of political influence. The idea that there is a given objective standard
to which all decisions can be referred and pronounced in (or not in) the public
interest is challenged. Applied to the budgetary process, the author's preference
for the competitive definition of politics is clear: "I am prepared to argue that
the partial-view-of-the-public-interest approach is preferable to the total-view-
of-the-public-interest approach, which is so often argued as being superior.""
The point is further illustrated in the statement that: "A partial adversary
system in which the various interests compete for control of policy (under
agreed upon rules) seems more likely to result in reasonable decisions - that
is, decisions that take account of the multiplicity of values involved - than
one in which the best policy is assumed to be discoverable by a well-intentioned
search for the public interest for all by everyone."' 2
Wildavsky, then, commits himself to the proposition that the competitive
definition of politics is both more in accord with reality and, as he defines it,
"better" than the general interest view. Thus he is led to challenge the as-
sumption that a comprehensive program budget is preferable to the "piece-
work" line-item or traditional approach. The author assesses, in the light of
the realities of the political system at the federal level, the wisdom of the major
reforms commonly suggested. The proposal for a Joint Congressional Budget
Policy Committee, designed to promote the comprehensive approach, is ques-
tioned, and held to be likely to increase the power of conservatives from safe
districts vis a vis the President - an "unanticipated consequence" that most
who support the proposal probably would not favor. It is argued, furthermore,
that unanticipated consequences would likely flow from the implementation of
the program budget itself, which Wildavsky contends would: (a) make it more
difficult for participants in the process to agree on what constitutes "fair
shares"; (b) make it vastly more difficult to carry out required calculations;
and (c) significantly alter the distribution of outputs, thus producing funda-
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The point of all this is that budget reforms, so casually proposed, are at best
based on an incomplete knowledge of how the budget process actually operates.
Furthermore, the extensive investment of time and energy by political scientists
in promoting reforms judged to be "best" has evidently left too little time for
empirical study of the system for which reform is being proposed. Wildavsky
makes clear that the major budget reform proposals, if they were to be fully
implemented, would require sweeping change in our political system -
change in the direction of concentration of power in the hands of a few, who
could then promulgate "coordinated" budget decisions. The author thus con-
cludes that most major reforms proposed to date are both unrealistic and un-
desirable. He does not say that no improvements in the present budget process
are possible; but he calls first for a greatly expanded effort to explain the
budget process as a prerequisite to reform.
While Wildavsky does assign to the Bureau of the Budget the major co-
ordinating role in the budgetary process, it might be argued that the bureau's
significance is underplayed. In my own research I have been interested in the
role of the bureau in attempts to impose greater coordination in the natural
resources area. Without question the Bureau of the Budget has tightened its
control in this field through several major policy moves in recent years. That
this effort has had its affect is best illustrated by the violent reaction in Con-
gress to any attempts to change the status quo in the highly sensitive area of
resource politics. In a Senate Public Works Sub-Committee hearing in 1956,
Congressman James W. Trimble offered testimony to the effect that:
The Bureau of the Budget has set itself up as a sort of legislative usurper.
No Government agency can come to the Congress requesting funds for
any project until it has a passport and a visa granted by that agency. We
cannot even take a look at a project unless the Bureau of the Budget grants
us permission. They are the chief high moguls of these river development
programs. No project can get to Congress for appropriations unless the
bureau approves. In order for the bureau to determine which thoroughbred,
milk-fed, vitaminized project can get to us for consideration, it has set up
its own rules. These rules were issued December 31, 1952, and are known
as Circular A-47.14
Perhaps the strongest protest to expanding Bureau of the Budget power in
the sensitive resource area came from the late Senator Robert S. Ierr during
joint hearings before the Senate Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs
and Public Works in 1957:
Now, if I interpret that language correctly, Mr. Chairman, it means that
under orders from the Bureau of the Budget, they have found a way to
supplant congressional action, and will, with a budget directive. They have
discovered a means of legislating by administrative order, not only in a
field where no legislative directive existed, but even in an area where legis-
lative directive does exist, where the will of the Congress was made plain
in its language, but where, by reason of disagreement of the Executive
14. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Flood Control, Rivers and Harbors of the
Senate Committee on Public Works, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. at 11 (1956).
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with the Legislative, they have substituted Executive decree for legislative
enactment and are operating on the basis of the executive decree, to wit,
Circular A-47.15
The key point is that there is all too little data available to substantiate or
refute the proposition that the Bureau of the Budget is in fact significantly
altering the political status quo by extending its coordinating power in the
budgetary process. Professor Wildavsky has made a major contribution to-
ward focusing research on the budgetary process and on how it actually oper-
ates within the political process. Imaginative conceptualizing and systematic
collection and analysis of data could lead to the development for the first time
of meaningful theory in this field. Professor Wildavsky's book is a beginning,
and a highly successful one. One would hope that many more studies widening
and deepening the analysis will follow. Finally, the data presented constitute
a powerful argument for pushing the reform effort into the background until
more - much more - is known about how the budgetary process actually
works.
JOHN M. DE GRoV4
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Legal History: Law and Social Change is one of a series of new paperbacks,
subtitled "Foundations of Law in a Business Society." The aim of the series
is to make available a group of "short, convenient, inexpensive and authori-
tative books written by scholars in their respective fields, systematically cov-
ering the subjects of primary interest to all nonprofessional students of the
law." Professor Kempin begins by asserting that his book is "about the history
of Anglo-American law." The statement is courageous. There are 109 pages
of text; to say anything meaningful about "the history of Anglo-American
law" in that space would be a minor miracle, especially since Professor Kempin
aims at telling no less than "a continued story of the development of the in-
stitutions of the law - its courts, juries, judges, and lawyers," while also
tracing "the beginnings and development of selected legal concepts."'
In many ways, the author does very well, despite the enormous obstacles
that face such a venture. He has succeeded in imposing a kind of order on
the chaos of his data. The writing is clean and dignified; the story is told
15. Joint Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and
Subcommittee on Flood Control, Rivers and Harbors of the Senate Comnittce on Public
Works, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. at 13 (1957).
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